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Abstract
We consider the problem of dividing a cake between two
individuals where one person cuts the cake and the other person
chooses which piece to consume. In a world filled mostly with
egoists, altruists have generally been considered to have a
problem with survival in the long run. As a chooser, an
altruist chooses the smaller piece and as divider the altruist
cuts the cake unequally so that the chooser can select the
bigger piece. Although altruists fare better when they face
other altruists, the question remains concerning their survival
as a group. However, altruists might survive quite well in the
long run when there is imperfect information for the divider as
to the social attitudes of the chooser. We show how the
d i v
i
de-and-choos e problem can be modelled under this type of
uncertainty and characterize the optimal cutting decision in
terms of subjective probabilities about the chooser's actions.
We also show how a higher degree of risk aversion on the part of
the chooser always leads to a more equal division of the cake
whenever possible. If there is a positive social value to the
survival of altruists, our model implies that there may be a
negative value of information.

I. INTRODUCTION
According to Steinhaus (1949), there is an old custom,
possibly originating in English law, of dividing an object
fairly by letting one partner choose his part. The rule seems to
be of some practical importance in bequest problems, where it
dispenses the heirs from an objective evaluation of the legacy
(e.g., a piece of land) by an outside expert. Taking the
division of a cake as an example, Steinhaus shows how the rule
may be extended to n players, and he argues that its application
leads to fair results in the sense that each player is assured
to receive, at least, a fraction of the total which he would
subjectively consider as appropriate on a priori considerations.
This paper introduces the combined influences of altruism,
eqoism and risk-aversion in the di
v
ide- and-choose decision
rule. Assuming that a cake is to be shared between two
individuals, the point of departure is that the divider has
imperfect information as to whether the chooser is selfish and
would choose the larger piece of the cake after the cut, or is
altruistic and would prefer the smaller piece of cake. In this
sense, the divider and the chooser are "strangers".
We show that imperfect information about the chooser's
social attitude and increased risk aversion induce the divider
to cut more equal shares. These results may be used as arguments
to partially resolve the altruism paradox (see Becker (1976) and
Wintrobe (1981)): in a competitive world whpre at least, some
individuals are selfish, altruism should be eliminated in the
long run by natural selection. But altruism may survive in a
world of asymmetric information. In this sense, as pointed out
in other contexts (see Hirshleifer, 1971), the value of
information in the long run might be negative, if we put a net
positive social value on the survival of altruism.
The next section presents the problem under certainty and
indicates how the individual's social attitude may be derived
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from assumptions about his or her utility function. In
section III, we drop the perfect information hypothesis and we
analyze how the divider's choice is affected by his personal
beliefs concerning the chooser's social attitude. It is demons
trated that an altruistic divider cuts more equal shares, wheri'
ever possible, the higher his subjective probability that the
chooser is also altruistic. In the fourth section, we show how
the degree of risk aversion affects the divider's optimal
choice .
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II. THE DIVIDE-AND-CHOOSE DECISION UNDER CERTAINTY
We assume the existence of two individuals : Mr. A (the
divider) and Ms. B (the chooser), who share a homogeneous and
attractive cake--their social income. The basic problem is for A to
cut the cake knowing that B has the choice of which piece she
prefers after the cut has been made. We assume that A has already
been predetermined to be the divider. 1
This problem was presented by Steinhaus (1949), who assumed
that individual preferences depended only upon their own level of
consumption. In this sense, the optimal decision for A would be to
cut the cake equally, since an unequal split would leave him with
the smal ler hal f
.
Steinhaus' analysis did not account for several interesting
possibilities, which are discussed by Garrabe' (1974). For example,
suppose that A actually prefers to see B have a larger share. In
this case, an unequal division by A would be preferred, so long as
he knows that B will choose the larger share for herself. Another
possibility is that, although A is greedy, he knnws that B will
choose the smaller piece because of her benevolent nature. Again
it is A's best interest to cut the cake unequally. One final
We don't address the question of whether or not A would prefer
to be the chooser, which indeed he may. This point was
illustrated well by the Chicago Bear's football coach, Mike
Ditka, who when asked if his team would take the ball if they
won the coin toss preceding the 1986 Super Bowl said yes, but
that he would prefer it if they would lose the toss.
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possibility is that both A and B would prefer to see the other
person get the larger share. In this case, the optimal decision
for A is to once again cut equal shares.
The above analysis presents a simple way to look at altruism
when A knows how B will behave. Our purpose in this section is to
make the definitions of altruism and egoism more precise in order
that we may extend the model to the case of imperfect information.
A generally accepted definition of altruism is the one used
by Becker (1976, p. 818), "An altruist is willing to reduce his
own consumption in order to increase the consumption of others."
Obviously, it is assumed that there exists no expectation of
reciprocity in the future: the altruist's utility depends directly
on the consumption level of others. Altruism is distinct from
"social exchange". The utility function of altruist i can be
written as:
U
i
= u
i
(x i' xj' • • •
'
x
n
} '
where x. represents i's consumption, and x.,...,x represent the
consumption of individuals j to n with whom altruist i interacts.
In Becker's and others' analyses, the problem is then to find the
optimal dollar amount an altruist transfers to others in order to
increase the utility derived from their own consumption.
This characterization of altruism is, however, not strong
enough to discriminate between true altruism and charity. Charity
(the rich donating to the poor) may be said to exist when i cares
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for j but gets more utility from own consumption. A charitable
person is marginally selfish; or, to quote a French saying,
"well-organized charity starts with oneself". In contrast, true
altruism exists when a person cares more for the others than for
oneself. This is what happens when an individual exposes himself
to danger in order to save the life of others, or when a person
chooses to spend her life looking after the well-being of others
(children, parents, disabled persons, etc.).
The distinction between charity and altruism is important
when one considers the divide and choose problem. As we show
below, if the charitable person is an egoist, she will always
choose the larger share of the cake. A true altruist, in contrast,
will always choose the smaller share. Thus, the fundamental social
attitude of an individual - egoism or altruism - is revealed by
her behavior as a chooser.
To define the model properly, we assume that individual A
possesses a strictly concave, increasing, and twice dif ferentiable
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(y,z) where y and z
denote the consumption of individuals A and B respectively. Since
we are considering the division of a cake of fixed size, we
normalize quantities such that y+z=l. Let x=min(y,z). Thus, x
denotes the size of the smaller share of the cake. We adopt the
following definitions:
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Def inition : A is said to be an egoist if
U
1
(y,z) > U
2
(z,y) for all y,z.
Definition: A is said to be an altruist if
U
1 (y f z) < U 2 (z,y) for all y,z.
Definition : A is said to be equitable if
U-j(y/Z) = U*
2
(z,y) for all y,z.
In the above definitions, the notation U. denotes the partial
derivative of U (i.e. the marginal utility) with respect to the
ith argument.
Note the interchange of y and z in each of the definitions
above. Thus, we compare A's situation with an alternative
situation where the bundles are reversed in each of the above
definitions. An egoist A, for example, who could increase the size
of the cake, has a higher marginal utility for adding more to his
current amount y given that B consumes z than he would if he added
more to y given that B consumes y and he consumes z. Loosely
speaking, A derives more pleasure from adding to his own
consumption than he would by seeing something added to B's
consumption were A's and B's shares to be reserved. (Note that
egoism as defined here does not rule out charitable behavior.)
The definitions of altruism and equitability have similar
interpretations, although we should point out that an individual
need not necessarily satisfy any of the above three definitions.
Of course, we could extend the definitions to local definitions of
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egoism, altruism and equity, but we don't pursue this topic here
and we only consider individuals who satisfy one of the three
definitions as they stand.
The following lemma turns out to be very useful. It basically
says that our simple minded notions of egoism and altruism
expressed earlier, follow from the above definitions. Note also
how the lemma implies that an altruist (egoist) will always choose
the smaller (larger) piece of a cake that is cut unequally.
Lemma : For all x, < x < 1/2
ian
egoist
equitable
an altruist.
proof
Consider
1/2
/[0
•x.
= u(i/2,i/; f (x)
U(x,l-x) = U(l/2,l/2) - U, (t,l-t)-U (t,l-t)]dt
and
1/2
U(l-x,x) = U(l/2,l/2) - /[U (l-t,t)-U.(l-t,t)]dt
= U(l/2,l/2) - g(x).
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From the definitions, it follows that
an egoist
f(x) = g(x) as A is 4 equitable
an altruist.
The conclusion follows immediately. Q.E.D.
It is important here to take note of ex#actly what our
definitions of egoism and altruism do and do not imply. An
altruist, for example, will always choose the smaller piece of the
cake. However, this does not imply that the altruist always
prefers a smaller piece to a larger piece of cake. A division in
which the altruist receives .4 of the cake may be either better or
worse than the case where he receives .3 of the cake. Our
definition also does not imply that an altruist would prefer every
share smaller than one-half of the cake to a share larger than
one-half of the cake. For example, an altruist might prefer
receiving .6 of the cake to his receiving .1 of the cake. Note
however, that the altruist would never choose the larger piece of
a cake that has already been cut. This is because, by our lemma,
the altruist will always prefer the smaller of the two cut pieces.
An example of consistent altruistic preferences is given in
figure 1. In figure 1, several indifference curves are illustrated
for Mr. A. The constraint that the cake shares total a constant
(scaled to be 1) is also drawn. We see, for example, that .1 is
preferred to .9 and .4 is preferred to .6 as A's share of the
cake, which follows by the lemma. However, given a choice of his
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receiving . 1 or .6 of the cake, A would prefer .6 of the cake. The
point is that an altruistic A would always prefer to be left with
the smaller piece of a cake he has already cut. Thus, even though
A prefers receiving .6 to .1, he would rather receive the smaller
piece of a 6/10— 4/10 cut of the cake. Or, given a 1/10— 9/10
division of the cake, A would prefer to receive the .1 share
himself rather than see B with so small a piece. A similar example
can be easily constructed for an egoist; and for an equitable Mr.
A, his indifference curves would be symmetric in his and B's
shares of the cake, with a most-preferred allocation of 1/2 of the
cake for each individual. Thus, the equitable Mr. A would be
indifferent to choosing the larger or smaller piece of a cake that
has been cut, but is always better off when the cake is cut more
equally.
From the lemma, our earlier results under perfect information
follow. In summary, A cuts the cake equally when both he and B are
altruists or egoists, and A cuts the cake unequally when he and B
differ, i.e. when he is an altruist and B is an egoist or vice
versa. If either A or B is equitable, the outcome is not quite so
straightforward. If A is equitable, he cuts the cake evenly
regardless of B's preferences. This follows from the first-order
condition and the lemma. For the case where B is equitable, not
much can be said unless we make additional assumptions as to how B
2
chooses when she is always indifferent to the two shares. One
2 It is worthwhile here to note that A's utility only depends on
the allocation of the cake. He does not take into account B's
preferences when cutting the cake in our model. In other words,
our altruist wants to give more to B whether B wants the larger
piece or not
!
-Im-
possible assumption is that B randomly chooses a share, but this
brings us to the topic of the next section; namely, how should A
cut the cake when he is uncertain as to which piece B will choose?
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III. DIVIDING THE CAKE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
When the perfect information hypothesis is dropped, the
divider becomes uncertain about the social attitude of the
chooser. When A cuts the cake, he does not know whether B will
take the larger or the smaller piece. In fact, we don't rule out
the possibility that B follows a mixed consumption strategy of
sometimes choosing the larger piece while other times choosing the
smaller piece. Whatever the reason, when A cuts the cake we assume
that he already has preassigned a probability, p, that B chooses
the larger piece.
Before examining egoism and altruism in the general cases, it
is illustrative to consider first two extreme cases:
Definition : A is an extreme egoist if
U
2
(y,z) = for all y,z.
Definition : A is an extreme altruist if
U,(y,z) = for all y,z.
We note that extreme egoists and altruists also satisfy the
earlier definitions of egoism and altruism respectively. Consider,
in particular, the case of an extreme egoist. His objective is to
maximize expected utility,
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EU = pU(x,l-x) + (l-p)U(l-x / x)
.
(1)
3
For this case, the first-order condition for maximizing (1) is
V*' 1-^ _ l-p
U
1
(l-x / x) " p (2)
Since U,, < and U~=0, we have a constrained optimum of x*=l/2 for
the case where p_>l/2, and an optimum of x*< 1/2 for p<l/2. That is,
whenever the extreme egoist thinks there's at least a 50 percent
chance of B choosing the larger piece, he will cut the cake
equally. For p<l/2, the optimal x* is monotonically increasing in
p. Thus, the inequality of the division monotonically increases as
A's subjective probability that B will choose the larger piece
declines
.
Some particular examples are illustrative at this point.
Using logarithmic utility, U(y,z)=ln y, leads to x*=p for p_<l/2.
Using a square root function, U(y,z)=^Ty', one obtains
2
x* = —^ for p 1 1/2,
2p -2p+l
which is monotonically increasing in p for p < 1/2. For a
constant-risk-aversion utility function, U (y , z ) =-exp ( -cy ) , where
3 A fuller version of the objective is to maximize E(y,z) where
E(y,z) = pU(y,z) + (l-p)U(z,y)
subject to y+z=l and 0<y£l/2. Defining V(y , z ) =U( z,y ) , we see
that V and U are both concave functions and hence so is E. Thus,
first-order conditions such as (2) will either yield an
expected-utility-maximizing x, 0<x<l/2; or Kuhn-Tucker
conditions will yield a corner solution of x=0 or x=l/2.
-13-
c >0 denotes A's degree of risk aversion, the optimal divison of
the cake is
x* - i - i- In (izE) for p < 1/2,
l Zc V ~
which is also increasing in p. Thus, a risk-averse extreme egoist
cuts equal shares if he gets the impression that the chooser is
probably an egoist (p>l/2), or if he has no information at all on
his social attitude (Laplace's Principle of Insufficient Reason
applies). He cuts unequal shares if he thinks that the chooser is
probably an altruist (p<l/2). But in this latter case, the smaller
share is an increasing function of the probability that the
chooser might, after all, be an egoist. We also note for now that,
in the last example, x* is increasing in the level of risk
aversion, c, for p<l/2. This is discussed further in section IV.
In a similar manner, it is easy to show that for the extreme
altruist, the optimal x* equals one-half for p£l/2, and x*<l/2 and
is decreasing in p for p>l/2. For the case where A is equitable,
it doesn't matter what his beliefs about p are, he will always cut
the cake equally. This is a rather strong result to arise from the
definition of equitable, although this result is not particularly
interesting and we won't consider the case where A is equitable
any further. We now turn to the more general cases of egoism and
altruism.
Having spent somewhat greater length above in our discussion
of the extreme egoist, we will consider here the case of the
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altruist in general. Letting EU ' denote dEU/dx, the first-order
condition for the general case is
EU' = p[U
1
(x, l-x)-U
2
(x,l-x) ]+(l-p) [U
2
(l-x,x)-U
1
(l-x / x) ] = 0. (3)
Since U, (y , z ) <U 2 ( z ,y ) for an altruist, it can be shown via
substitution into (3) that
U,(x,l-x) - U
2
(x,l-x) < EU' < U
2
(l-x,x) - U^l-XjX). (4)
We can easily interpret (4) in economic terms. The left-hand side
(LHS) of the inequality represents the net gain or loss (i.e.
marginal benefit minus marginal cost in utility terms) from
increasing x when it is known that A gets the smaller share. The
right-hand side (RHS) of this expression denotes the net gain or
loss when it is known that A gets the larger share. We note that
EU' = p(LHS) + (l-p)(RHS). (5)
Thus EU ' is a weighted average of the marginal utilities described
by LHS and RHS. From (3) and (4), we see that in equilibrium for
x*<l/2, LHS<0<RHS.
Consider now the case where x*<l/2 for a particular value of
p. If p is increased to p but x* remains unchanged, from (5) it
follows that EU ' , evaluated at x* and using p, will be negative.
Thus, x<x* where x denotes the optimal division of the cake when
B's probability of choosing the larger piece is p. Thus, for
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x*<l/2, x* is monotonically decreasing in p. As p falls (i.e. as
it becomes more likely that B will choose the smaller piece), an
altruistic A reacts by cutting more equal shares.
It is also not difficult to show that we obtain a corner
solution of x*=l/2 whenever p£l/2. To see this, consider (3)
evaluated at x=l/2:
l
x=1/2=p[U 1 (l/2,l/2)-U 2 (l/2,l/2) ]
+ (1-p) [U
2
(l/2 # l/2)-U 1 (l/2 f l/2) ] =0,
(6)
which only holds for p=l/2. For an altruist, EU
*
>0 (<0) for
x=l/2
p<l/2 (p>l/2). Taking the constraint x£l/2 into account, it
follows that x*=l/2 as a constrained optimum for p£l/2, and x*<l/2
for p >l/2.
.v.The case of an egoist follows a similar manner. In this case,
it follows that x* = l/2 whenever p>_l/2, and x*<l/2 and is
increasing in p for p<l/2. In the next section, we show how the
divider's level of risk aversion affects the choice of x*.
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IV. INCREASES IN THE LEVEL OF RISK AVERSION
For the case of an extreme egoist with a utility function
exhibiting a constant level of absolute risk aversion c, we saw
that for x*<l/2, x* was increasing in the level of risk aversion.
Thus, for p <l/2 a more risk averse A would cut the cake more
equally. The definition of risk aversion we are using here is the
standard Arrow-Pratt measure for utility of wealth. For a
univariate utility V(x), this measure equals -V" (x)/V (x)
.
Although we are writing utility as U(y,z), in the case of the
extreme egoist U =0 for all y and z, so that we essentially have a
utility function with one argument. The case of an extreme
altruist with constant absolute risk aversion is similar in that
it essentially uses a utility function that depends only on the
second argument (the chooser's level of consumption). For this
case, it turns out that
x* - i+ i- In (i-E) for p > 1/2,
2 2c p
which is also increasing in c for p 1/2. Thus, we see that a more
risk-averse divider, whether he is an extreme egoist or an extreme
altruist, will always cut the cake more equally whenever possible,
provided that preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
Our purpose in this section is to generalize these results to
the general cases of egoism and altruism, and to risk-averse
utility in general. In this respect, we need to first define our
notion of "more risk averse" for the case of multidimensional
utility. Fortunately, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) develop such a
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measure. We will say that A becomes more risk averse if his
preferences change to k[U(y,z) ], where k is an increasing, twice
dif ferentiable and strictly concave function. As noted by
Kihlstrom and Mirman, such a notion of "more risk averse" only
makes sense for the case of comparing two individuals with
identical underlying ordinal preferences. But since we concern
ourselves here with only a change in A's attitude toward risk,
without changing his preference ordering for the case of choices
made under certainty, this measure is applicable.
The main result of this section is given by the following
proposition:
Proposition : Suppose that A is either an egoist or an
altruist. If A becomes more risk averse, he will always cut
the cake more equally (whenever that is possible).
proof of the Proposition :
By the definition of "more risk averse" we assume the
existence of a monotonic, concave transformation k such that
V(y, z ) =k[U(y , z ) ] , where V denotes A's more risk-averse
preferences. Let x* denote A's optimal division for preferences
expressed by U, and let x denote A's optimal division for the more
risk-averse preferences V. Now,
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EV = k^p[LHS] + k^(l-p) RHS (7)
where LHS and RHS are defined as in (5) and where
k
1
= k' (U(x,l-x) )
and
k^ = k'(U(l-x,x)).
By our previous lemma, U(x, 1-x) >U( 1-x, x) if A is an altruist.
Thus, k ' <k' by the concavity of k. However, since we know from (3)
and (5) that LHS<0<RHS for an altruist with x*<l/2, it follows
from (7) that EV ' > when evaluated at x*. Hence, x>x* for the
altruist when x*<l/2. The cases where x*=l/2 and where A is an
egoist are easily proven in a similar manner. Q.E.D.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For the case of perfect information, selfish behavior among the
other players will condemn a true altruist to a very frugal life. As
a divider, he will cut for himself a small part of the cake, leaving
the rest to the egoistic chooser. As a chooser, he will accept the
smaller part cut for him by the egoistic divider. Even though al-
truists will be better off when they face other altruists, the ques-
tion remains of their survival as a group. In the bequest arrange-
ments mention ned by Steinhaus (1949), altruists would clearly get
the worst of it , and provided such arrangements were not too rare,
they would on average become less wealthy. The existence of altruisrr
as a social attitude would be jeopardized in the long run. Only
egoists would survive.
This changes however when we introduce a degree of uncertainty
into the chooser's decision. We might note that if altruistic be-
havior is relatively rare, then an egoistic divider might think of p
as being close to one and cut the cake equally. In this case, al-
truists' survival is assured if they are often enough the choosers.
On the other hand, in a world with a majority of altruists, if p is
fairly small, egoists will cut the cake more unequally, but the
altruists will themselves cut the cake more equally when they are
the dividers. Furthermore, the more risk averse is society in gen-
eral, the more equally will the cake be divided by both egoists and
altruists alike. In such a world, the survival of altruism is no
longer a pa rado x
.
Of course, the result rests on the rather crude approach adopt-
ed in the present paper. It remains to be seen whether it still
holds in a more elaborate framework, e.g. a dynamic model where in-
dividuals are at times choosers, at times dividers, and information
about their social attitude is evolving over time. This is left for
future research on the social implications of divide-and-choose
arrangements.
A Note that altruists get what they prefer, and therefore the
allotment is Pareto-optimal.
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